501 The crew must obey the master in the working of the boat, as
460 their job includes all operations, including loading and unloading. They can transfer at will (to another boat) whenever they like, in which case they are reimbursed with the gross value of their part of the profits, and in justifiable absences, such as short illnesses, the death of some relative, etc., there is no discount from their wages, if they are co-participants in the business; but this requires justification in front of the master and the consent of the rest of the crew, as well as previous warning.....

226 In fishing boats, they are accountable for the maintenance;
501 in boats of transport, they have charge of the profits.

226 C) Profits:
434

1) Fishing in a boat with net: the gross value of the sale is divided into two equal parts, one for the master and one for the crew. In addition to this, the master also receives one-seventh of the owner's share.

2) Fishing in a boat with hook: the gross value of the catch is divided into three equal parts; one for the owner of the appartus (net, lines, hooks....), another (not listed, probably a typographical error) and the last for the crew. Those who haul the nets on shore receive a few kilos of fish.

3) Fishing with explosives: three equal parts, two for the owner of the explosives and the third for the swimmer.

505 4) Transport of Travelers and Merchandise: the profits of the
434 trip, after maintenance expenses and port duties have been discounted, i.e. the true profit, are analogously divided into two parts, in the same proportion as in the case of fishing boats.

312 The
562 jma'ths agree on the amount of the fines to be imposed for infractions
[623] of these rules, especially those having to do with the freedom of
[681] women, forbidding the men either to come near them or to remain in those paths which lead to their washing or bathing sites. Ordinarily, in this case, a turn is set up for a boy to act as guard, at a prudent distance from the site, if the latter by its topographical situation or by its distance from the village renders such a move necessary.

D) Irrigation in General:

312 The utilization of water in the Central Rif, particularly
675 among the Aith Waryaghar, is the object, in both general and particular cases, of agreements between the users; these agreements are made at the beginning of the summer for those water points which have a small or intermittent flow and which are of short duration. These agree-
[212] ments are also usually unwritten, and they deal with the following points: 1) dams, 2) network of irrigation ditches, 3) repairs to ditches, 4) turns (nubth, pl. nubath) of those who irrigate, and 5) infractions and sanctions.

[466] The labor as well as the necessary repairs are done by compulsory personal service (twiza)[119] and proportional contributions on the part of the irrigators. Any ditches which need special work
[333] done on them, such as bridges or retaining dams, are previously agreed upon to be done by contract with master-masons, with the cost of the materials included.

312 Infractions are usually reduced to: 1) appropriation by anyone
689 of a turn or turns of water outside or exceeding his own, and 2)
241 differences and disputes which during the "Republik" were settled
242
627

000 [648] [744] 118--Malaria, of the "paludism" variety, was a considerable problem in the Rif of 1939, of which Blanco writes. In 1952-53, however, the Spanish administration conducted a vigorous DDT campaign, which made considerable strides in stamping out this disease.

119--Twiza is also often translated as "corvee". In Rifian, the word is dhiwiza, pl. dhiwizawin.

[466] 120--Any individual who failed to show up to take part in a twiza organized for repairing a ditch (of which he was--or is--one of the users) had to pay a fine ranging from about three to five duros. This fine, however, was not and is not paid to the aquwwam, but is levied as r-haqq by the jma'th in question, whose members buy and consume tea and sugar with the proceeds.

121--Irrigation turns, after the lots have been drawn to establish the order in which they occur, continue in the same order until something happens to the ditch, i.e. if it is washed out by a storm or if it loses water completely; and then lots are drawn again.

122--In 1953, the Granja Agricola had two days out of an eight day irrigation turn cycle, from the Dharga Hadhidha, on the left bank of [613] the Nkur River. The other six days, the following lineages irrigated from the same ditch: Bu Srama (Izakiren, in the Aith Bu 'Ayyash), Ixatshumen n Waddai (Isrihan, in the Aith Yusif w 'Ari), Ihaddjiyen (Izakiren, in the Aith Bu 'Ayyash), r-'Aramth (affiliation unknown), Aith 'Alla (Imhawren, in the Aith 'Ari) and Aith Bu Minqadh (a "foreign element", supposedly from the Sus, in the Aith r-'Abbas subclan of the Aith 'Ari).

123--An akhammas is a poor sharecropper who receives one-fifth of the grain harvest of a richer individual with whom he has an annual verbal contract.

124--Blanco handles in a most able manner the whole question of the relationship of irrigation turns to lineage structure. Although by no means 100% accurate in all instances, his equation of the usage of secondary ditches by dharfiqin and of the smaller tertiary branches by the ijujga, or lineage branches, is certainly correct enough and widespread enough, in the Plain of al-Husaima in particular (where the distribution of irrigation turns is a very complicated affair), to be taken as a rule of thumb.

125--This seems a strange remark, particularly because it is italicized; as only plowing and sowing takes place in winter in the Rif, while the harvest is taken in mid-summer. However, it is possibly intended in irony, to show the poverty of the region.

126--Blanco refers here, in somewhat poetic and rhapsodic fashion, to the great topographical difference between the arid mountains along the upper course of the Ghis and the fertile alluvial Plain of al-Husaima which characterizes much of its lower course.

127--This number may have been 55 in 1939; it was certainly much higher in 1961.

128--Blanco mistranslates l-Bzimma, and, by extension, al-Masimma, as "the renowned".

423 The number of men under such association is difficult to estimate
427 though I have the impression it is large. No man whom I inter-
464 viewed who might be roughly classified as a leader in the community had less than one person working for him in such a relationship.

427 The most prominent and common association is that of the
464 akhammas or sharecroppers. The akhammas is a laborer who voluntarily contracts to contribute all the physical labor necessary for the total production process of a piece of land. The landowner provides the land itself, the seed, fertilizer, plough and any other equipment, and the animal power. The akhammas provides all labor, from the initial ploughing to the ultimate harvesting.
[465] For his services he receives exactly one-fifth of the yield,
[466] hence the name which derives from hamsa or 'five.' The akhammas also receives the hand-me-down clothes of the master and often a meal each day. Since the activities of the akhammas entail his
427 constant presence around or even inside the household, he has far
464 greater access to the wives of notables than other males. A man
562 of sufficient wealth to employ an akhammas would probably isolate his wife from contact with male society. It is a myth that the Berbers do not seclude their women. The only ones who are not secluded from male society are the wives of poor men who must contribute their labor to the production process. Such women are, of course, the vast majority. The akhammas has more contact with the wives of the notable class than any other male not closely related to the family. Since the akhammas must consult

427 464 562 the wife about household tasks and often takes his meals inside the central patio, he is on rather intimate (for the Rif) terms with these women. In such a close and anomalous situation, there [602] is a preference on the part of the master to hire a poor relative, especially of his wife, as a servant. By hiring a man of the wife's family or of a family which includes the wife's relatives by marriage, one lessens the danger of too close a relationship between wife and akhammas.

427 464 466 465 565 While both partners in the akhammas arrangement seek to establish a contract which is divorced from social conflict over women, they are nonetheless in basic conflict along incipient class lines. The akhammas, at least in the contemporary situation, regards himself as being exploited by his patron in that the wage scale is fixed and involves difficult manual labor without any guarantees of remuneration. While he is free to negotiate his contract with whomever he so desires, his wage depends directly on the size of the crop yield for any one year. The master with greater reserves of resources suffers only an inconvenience if the crop yield is low. The sharecropper, on the other hand, has few if any reserves, and any reduction in the portion of his share has serious repercussions on his ability to maintain his household. The akhammas is especially aware of the inequity of this arrangement as wage opportunities open up and he becomes aware that salary can be negotiated with commensurate rewards in cash. Most ikhammasen prefer to get into the category of wage

427 laborer, especially as a migrant worker in Europe or Algeria,
464 where salaries are high by Riffian standards.
465
466 On the other end of the spectrum are the landowners who
565 regard the akhammas as the true beneficiary of the association. They argue that since they provide all the elements of production except labor, they are being exploited by the working class. The akhammas provides only his manual labor for a few weeks of ploughing and again for a few weeks at harvest time. Their contention is that although the work is arduous, it spans over a relatively short period of time for which the akhammas receives enough to meet his subsistence needs for the year. The remainder of the year the akhammas is free to contract for such labor as is available. The property owner, however, depends exclusively on his crop and thus does not have the additional revenues which the worker earns throughout the rest of the year. If the crop yield is low, the master will always see to it that the worker gets something, and besides the poor can apply for government relief while the rich can not. I suggested to several owners that they
[123] engage a wage laborer for the short duration of actual work involved in performing the cultivation tasks but was met with only stony silence at the notion of such a scheme. I did not encounter and no one ever spoke of an instance in which agricultural labor was paid for in daily or weekly wages. Since the property class is in a position to change the system but does not, presumably the akhammas arrangement works to their benefit.

6: Joseph E-5 (1965-1966) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3

675 commercial transactions in an industrial society, legal surety in the Rif tends to be based on prestige, reputation, and status. Rights, privileges, duties, immunities, and liabilities are mostly non-contractual (excluding land titles and marriage documents). 675 Thus working associations between the wealthier and poorer men 466 of the community, whereby a laborer who provides all the work on 464 another man's piece of property and receives one-fifth of the crop, are always verbal agreements. Likewise, agreements over such a critical area as water rights, including the rotation of rights of irrigation, are exclusively verbal. Partnerships, pledges, leases, warranties and so forth are rarely 'paperized' but based, rather, on verbal agreement.

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how the 556 social and cultural configuration of Berber existence affects 554 the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Among the Riffians 182 wealth as an abstract has little meaning. Wealth gains signifi- 183 cance when it is an attribute of prestige (although prestige does [128] not depend entirely on wealth). Prestige is gained from living by the code of the community and fulfilling one's obligations to the community. Those who fulfill such obligations have political prestige both in the realm of the Berber community and outside it. A direct consequence of this is that profit as a system of motivation has little operative or analytic value in determining what happens to material goods. Resources are not 'free'; they cannot be allocated in a social vacuum to obtain maximum financial rewards. On the contrary, resources are socially 'bound' by